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BANKRUPTCY
Can a Debtor’s Exemption Assets Be Surcharged as a Sanction for Misconduct?
CASE AT A GLANCE
In chapter 7 bankruptcy, a debtor keeps certain statutorily defined “exempt” assets, while all other assets
are sold to pay creditors. In exchange, most of the debtor’s debts are discharged. In this case, the Court
must decide whether a debtor may be sanctioned by the loss of exempt assets as an equitable remedy
for trying to fraudulently claim excess exemptions or hide assets, with the forfeited assets awarded to the
bankruptcy estate to recover litigation costs arising from the debtor’s misconduct.

Law v. Siegel
Docket No. 12-5196
Argument Date: January 13, 2014
From: The Ninth Circuit
by Marshall Tracht
New York Law School, New York, NY

INTRODUCTION
A basic principle of bankruptcy law is that an honest but unfortunate
debtor should be granted a “fresh start” by having most of his or
her debts discharged while retaining a certain amount of “exempt”
assets, generally defined by state law. The Bankruptcy Code states
that exempt assets cannot be used to pay prepetition debts or
administrative costs of the bankruptcy case, with a number of very
limited exceptions based on specific categories of misconduct. At
issue in this case is whether the court can use its equitable powers
to “surcharge” some or all of a debtor’s exempt assets and allocate
them to cover the bankruptcy estate’s litigation expenses, where the
debtor has engaged in egregious misconduct regarding those assets
during the bankruptcy case.

ISSUE
Does a bankruptcy court have the authority, under Bankruptcy
Code § 105 or its inherent power to prevent abuse of the judicial
process, to sanction a debtor who engages in egregious misconduct
by attempting to wrongly inflate exemptions or hide assets during
the bankruptcy case, by surcharging the debtor’s exempt assets to
compensate the bankruptcy trustee for the costs of litigation arising
directly from the debtor’s misconduct?

FACTS
The petitioner, Stephen Law, is a defendant in a tort case. In an
effort to shield his home from any judgment that might be entered
against him, he recorded a fraudulent mortgage in favor of “Lin’s
Mortgage and Associates,” which would have priority over any
lien in favor of the tort victim. The home was already subject to a
legitimate mortgage of about $150,000 to Washington Mutual Bank;
together these liens would absorb more than $318,000 of value in
the home. In October 1999, about four months after the fraudulent
mortgage was recorded, a judgment was entered against Law in the

196

amount of $131,822. Under California law, a debtor is entitled to exempt up to $75,000 in the value of a homestead after paying off any
mortgages, but ahead of any judgment liens. Thus, the tort claimant
would receive nothing by foreclosing on the judgment lien unless
the property sold for more than $393,000.
Law filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy case in 2004, listing the home as
his only significant asset. His filings estimated the home’s value
at $363,000, and showed it subject to roughly $450,000 in liens: a
$147,000 mortgage in favor of Washington Mutual, the fraudulent
mortgage, and several judgment liens. If these values were correct,
the bankruptcy trustee could be expected to abandon the house to
Law and let lienholders foreclose on it because there would be no
value for the bankruptcy estate after the liens were satisfied.
In fact, the bankruptcy trustee sold the house in 2006 for $680,000,
leaving about $209,000 after liens (excluding the fraudulent mortgage) and costs of the sale. Of this, Law would normally have been
entitled to $75,000 as his homestead exemption, with the remainder
going to the bankruptcy estate to cover administrative expenses
and Law’s other debts and the excess, if any, being returned to Law.
However, the trustee had expended inordinate amounts of time and
money in litigation with Law over the fraudulent mortgage, with
Law forging documents, filing countless motions, and obstructing
discovery. Acting pro se, he filed at least 15 separate appeals over
the course of the litigation.
The trustee moved to “surcharge” Law’s exemption to pay for the
costs of this litigation. Simplifying the proceedings that followed,
the bankruptcy court granted that motion, which was then reversed
on appeal (largely because the fraudulent nature of the mortgage
had not yet been proven), and Law’s position was affirmed by the
Ninth Circuit. A second surcharge motion was filed and, after much
litigation, the bankruptcy court again ruled for the trustee. This
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time, the court expressly found that (1) the mortgage was fraudulent; (2) absent that fraud and Law’s other misrepresentations to
the court there would have been “ample funds” to cover administrative expenses and pay all creditors even after Law’s $75,000 exemption, and (3) the bankruptcy estate had incurred more than $450,000
in legal fees as a direct result of Law’s misconduct. The bankruptcy
court therefore entered an order surcharging the homestead in its
entirety, applying all $75,000 to the trustee’s litigation costs.
This decision was upheld by a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, and then
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of appeals held that
a debtor’s exemptions can be surcharged, but only in “exceptional
circumstances” such as this case, “when a debtor engages in inequitable or fraudulent conduct that, when left unchallenged, denies
creditors access to property in excess of that which is properly exempted under the Bankruptcy Code.” This was in accord with a First
Circuit decision written by Justice Souter, sitting by designation,
Malley v. Agin, 693 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2012), and at odds with a Tenth
Circuit case, In Re Scrivner, 535 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).

CASE ANALYSIS
Section 522 of the Bankruptcy Code states that a debtor “may
exempt” certain property, generally defined by state law, from the
bankruptcy estate and that such property is not available to satisfy
general prepetition claims or administrative costs of the bankruptcy
case. This, together with the discharge of debts, permits individuals
a fresh start and prevents debtors and their dependents from being
left as wards of the state. The petitioner’s main argument is that
Congress set forth precise and limited exceptions to the protection
given to exempt assets and that bankruptcy courts may not disregard
the statute by crafting further exceptions.
First, the statute provides express limitations on some exemptions
if a debtor has been found guilty of certain misconduct. For example,
§ 533(q)(1) caps homestead exemptions at $155,675 if the debtor
“has been convicted of a felony … which under the circumstances,
demonstrates that the filing of the case was an abuse of the provisions of this title.”
Second, § 522(k) states that exempt assets may not be used to pay
“any administrative expenses” other than those incurred specifically
to recover the exempt asset. (That is, if the asset was transferred
prepetition and the trustee brings an avoidance action and recovers
the asset, only to have it exempted from the estate by the debtor,
the trustee can recover the relevant litigation costs from the exempt
asset.) Thus, Congress has set forth very clearly the circumstances
in which “any administrative expense”—such as the legal fees incurred by the trustee in this case—can be charged against exempt
assets.
Third, § 522(c) allows a small number of specific claims to be paid
out of otherwise exempt assets, such as domestic support obligations, certain tax claims, and education loans procured by fraud.
Permitting a court to surcharge exempt assets for other purposes
would potentially harm these parties by putting the trustee’s recovery ahead of them, even though Congress expressly chose to protect
them by allowing them to reach assets unavailable to any other
creditors.
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The petitioner argues that Congress has defined the limited circumstances under which a debtor may be deprived of his or her statutory
exemptions and narrowly circumscribed the ability of creditors or
the trustee to reach exempt assets, and courts may not craft additional exceptions based on equitable principles. This follows from
a canon of statutory construction: where Congress has explicitly
enumerated exceptions to general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary
legislative intent.
Moreover, Congress has set forth various penalties for misconduct
before or during the bankruptcy case, including dismissal of the
bankruptcy case, denial of discharge, or even criminal charges
in appropriate cases, but left no room in § 522 for courts to limit
exemptions on discretionary or equitable grounds, having determined, petitioner argues, that “even culpable debtors should not be
left penniless after bankruptcy.” This may be because exemptions
protect not only the debtor who engaged in wrongdoing, but also
that debtor’s dependents, who presumably have not.
In granting the motion to surcharge, the bankruptcy court relied
on its inherent equitable power and on § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, which provides:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that
is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed
to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action
or making any determination necessary or appropriate to
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent
an abuse of process.
According to the petitioner, the bankruptcy court’s order cannot be
justified under § 105, because that order is directly at odds with
§ 522 and thus is not “carrying out the provisions of this title.” Similarly, the order cannot be justified by the bankruptcy court’s inherent
equitable powers because “whatever equitable powers remain in the
bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.” Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,
485 U.S. 197 (1988).
The respondent argues that bankruptcy courts have the authority
under § 105 to take actions that are “appropriate” to carry out the
provisions of the Code, an authority that goes beyond those orders
that are strictly “necessary” (a limitation that had existed under
the old Bankruptcy Act). Surcharging a debtor’s exemptions may
be appropriate to carry out various provisions, such as those requiring the debtor to honestly disclose his or her assets and liabilities
(§ 521(a)(1)(B)(i)), to “cooperate with the trustee as necessary to
enable the trustee to perform the trustee’s duties” (§ 521(a)(3)), to
“surrender to the trustee all property of the estate” (§ 521(a)(4)),
and to exempt those assets the statute permits (§ 522(b)(1)).
This is essentially the reasoning of the opinion drafted by Justice
Souter, sitting by designation, in Malley. There, the court upheld
a bankruptcy court’s decision to surcharge exempt property on account of the concealment by the debtor of $25,000 he had received
prepetition.
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Moreover, respondent claims, bankruptcy courts have the inherent
authority, as does any court, “to fashion an appropriate sanction for
conduct which abuses the judicial process” (quoting Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991)). As Justice Souter wrote in Malley:
There could not be a clearer example of foiling abuse of
process than a surcharge order mitigating the effect of
fraud in retaining non-exempt assets and thus enhancing
the set-aside for a fresh start beyond the amount Congress
provided for the honest debtor. Nor can one easily imagine
an order more necessary, for although the enumerated
remedies of dismissal or denial of discharge penalize the
dishonest debtor, they add nothing to the pot for listed
creditors, who would otherwise bear the brunt of the fraud.
Indeed, bankruptcy courts had denied exemptions on equitable
grounds in a number of pre-Code cases, and the Bankruptcy Code
generally will not be read to reverse pre-Code practice absent a
“clear indication” that Congress so intended.
Respondent also relies in part on Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549
U.S. 365 (2007), a 5-4 decision in which the Court examined
whether a bankruptcy court could bar a debtor from converting a
chapter 7 case to chapter 13 in “bad faith.” The Bankruptcy Code
provides that a debtor “may convert a case [under chapter 7] to a
case under chapter 11, 12 or 13 at any time...” The Code’s only express limitations on this right are if (1) the chapter 7 case had been
originally converted from another chapter, or (2) the debtor is not
otherwise eligible for the chapter to which it seeks to convert. The
structure of the Marrama argument was essentially identical to that
in the current case: whether the debtor’s ability to take an act which
the statute says he “may” take, and which is subject to certain
specific exceptions in the Code, can be subject to further limitations
imposed by a court.

As noted above, § 522 specifically limits the ability to use exempt
assets to cover administrative expenses. Respondent notes that
§ 522(k) protects exempt assets from being used for typical administrative expenses, which are defined by the Code as “the actual,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate”; respondent
argues that the expenses at issue here are not “necessary” expenses of preserving the estate. Rather, they are “extraordinary expenses
occasioned by abusive litigation conduct that unnecessarily drains
the estate of value,” and so are not covered by § 522(k).
Finally, the respondent argues that bankruptcy is intended to
provide relief to “honest but unfortunate debtors.” The fresh start
is granted in exchange for the debtor disclosing and turning over all
applicable property, and where the debtor has chosen to hide assets
or commit fraud on the estate, there is no unqualified entitlement to
keep exempt property. Petitioner responds by noting that the Code
contains many other sanctions for dishonest conduct, and that denying exemptions is neither necessary in light of those alternatives
nor justifiable given the provisions of § 522. This was the reasoning
of the Tenth Circuit in Scrivner, which noted that the arguments for
surcharging a dishonest debtor’s exempt assets are “compelling”
but still found surcharging inconsistent with the statute and unnecessary in light of the other tools available to sanction misconduct.

SIGNIFICANCE
Exemptions matter both for debtors and for their dependents, and
while it is difficult to be sympathetic to one who perpetrates a fraud
on the court and his creditors, one justification for exemptions is
that the debtor’s dependents should not become further victims
of the debtor’s misconduct, or wards of the state because of that
misconduct. Various amici have stressed the importance of exemptions to the debtor’s fresh start and to the well-being of the debtor’s
dependents.

Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Marrama, noted two
alternative bases for upholding the bankruptcy court’s order: § 105,
and the inherent power of any court to sanction abusive litigation
practices. The dissent (written by Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas) would have held that
the bankruptcy court’s action was invalid because neither § 105 nor
the court’s inherent equitable powers can be used to “contravene
the provisions of the Code” by imposing limitations beyond those
set forth in the statute.

Perhaps the most important aspect of this case is one that appears
to have gone unnoted in the briefs. Chapter 7 trustees are compensated by a $60 administrative fee in each case, plus a percentage
of the assets distributed to unsecured creditors (this excludes
recoveries by secured creditors such as mortgage and auto lenders). However, the vast majority of chapter 7 cases are “no asset
cases”—that is, there are no unencumbered assets other than those
protected by the debtor’s exemptions, so the administrative fee is all
the trustee earns.

The respondent claims that disallowing an exemption on equitable
grounds is not inconsistent with § 522 and its narrow express limitations. First, respondent argues, those limitations apply only after
it has been determined that the debtor is entitled to a particular
exemption and therefore do not come into play if a court finds that
the exemption should be disallowed on equitable grounds. Second,
the limitations in § 522 were adopted piecemeal, at various times
and for various purposes, and were “not intended to work together
as an exhaustive legislative pronouncement on how exemptions
may be restricted.” They are specific grounds for denying or limiting
exemptions but do not purport to be the exclusive grounds for doing
so. Thus, respondent argues, § 522 limitations should not be read to
limit the court’s power to sanction abusive litigation practices.

If exempt assets can be reached by the trustee in defined circumstances, trustees may have a substantial incentive to go after those
assets. The amounts at stake can be substantial, including the
equity in a debtor’s home (a number of states allow an unlimited
amount of home equity to be exempted) and retirement accounts,
which are generally exempt. Moreover, while a trustee receives only
a percentage on amounts recovered for unsecured creditors (25
percent on the first $5,000, 10 percent on the next $45,000, and less
thereafter), administrative expenses such as attorney’s fees are
paid off the top—and chapter 7 trustees can and do hire their own
firms to do litigation.
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On the positive side, this is likely to result in closer policing of
debtor misconduct by bankruptcy trustees; on the negative side, it
may drive up the cost of chapter 7 bankruptcy cases and force even
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honest debtors to settle with the trustee out of their otherwise
exempt assets to avoid protracted litigation, impairing the fresh
start. If the Court permits surcharging, the critical question will be
the standards for imposing a surcharge—these would determine
the nature and strength of the incentives for trustees.

Marshall Tracht is a professor of law at New York Law School. He
can be reached at mtracht@nyls.edu or 212. 431.2139.
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In December, the Court heard a number of interesting cases. Below we highlight some of the more engaging comments
between the justices and the advocate during Lozano v. Alvarez (Docket No. 12-820). Lozano presented the Court with
the question of whether the “now settled” defense to a Hague Abduction Convention claim for return of a
child to the country from which she was abducted is subject to equitable tolling.
Ms. Lauren Moskowitz (on behalf of respondent): Your Honor, your
concern is not wrong, but I think it’s not founded on what … will
happen here. I don’t think it encourages abduction and concealment because that—those facts of concealment are going to be
taken into account into whether the child, in fact, is settled.
Justice Samuel Alito: Well, all right. Perhaps that’s the solution to
the problem then. I wonder if you would accept that, that there is no
equitable tolling, let’s assume for the sake of argument, but abduction is a strong factor that weighs against the return, that weighs
against the failure to return the child, not just something that can
be disposed of in a sentence, which is basically what the district
court did here, but a very strong factor that has to be taken into
account in the exercise of equitable discretion.

*

*

*

*

Ms. Moskowitz: [I]f the parent is moving from place to place to
evade detection or changing the child’s name or not enrolling the
child in school to avoid detection …

Chief Justice John Roberts: Those [of] us from the Midwest think
it’s actually easier to hide a child in New York. (Laughter.)
Ms. Moskowitz: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Sotomayor: I do have a point—a question though. What
sense does this make when—that a child who—a suit is filed
within the year, but the litigation takes 2 or the child who—the
filing is a day after the year, and the litigation takes a year and
they’re both in the same situation. Why should those two children
be treated differently? Why should one have the benefit of settled
now and the other not have it?

*

*

*

*

Justice Stephen Breyer: [O]n the one hand, we don’t want to
encourage abductions. On the other hand, we don’t want to treat
the child as a yo-yo.
Mr. Shaw Regan (on behalf of petitioner): Absolutely.

Justice Sonia Sotomayor: My gosh, all it takes is moving to Peoria.
I mean, I don’t mean to denigrate Peoria, but all it takes is moving
to a place that has no connection to …

Justice Breyer: So the question is whether the custody hearing will
be in a family court in Britain or whether it’ll be in a family court in
the United States.

Justice Antonin Scalia: Justice Sotomayor is from New York.

Mr. Regan: That’s right.

Justice Sotomayor: Yes, obviously. (Laughter.)

Justice Breyer: That’s the correct question; is that right?
Mr. Regan: That is the question.
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